In an appeal against an enforcement notice directed at the residential use of a stable block in County Durham (DCS Number 400-020-325) an inspector found no difficulty in identifying the meaning of ‘residential paraphernalia’.
The appellant argued that the requirement to remove residential paraphernalia, fixtures and fittings, within the building was excessive and also that residential paraphernalia was insufficiently defined. However, the inspector noted that paraphernalia is defined in the Oxford dictionary as “miscellaneous articles, especially the equipment needed for a particular activity”. He was not persuaded that there should be any difficulty identifying miscellaneous articles or fixtures and fittings relating to the residential use of the building and land. He considered the term to be sufficiently precise and not readily open to misinterpretation.
Nonetheless, retrospective permission was granted subject to a unilateral undertaking to remove all items of domestic paraphernalia, including washing lines, children’s play equipment and garden structures and furniture, from specified parts of the site, and thereafter keeping these areas clear of such paraphernalia.
Further appeal examples concerning domestic paraphernalia at residential conversions can be found at section 10.1354 of DCP Online.
A proposal for 16 residential park homes on the edge of a village in Oxfordshire was dismissed at appeal in the absence of affordable housing provision, despite the appellant’s argument that the homes would themselves be affordable (DCS Number 400-020-174).
Development plan policy set out that 40 per cent affordable housing would be sought on all sites where there was a net gain of three or more dwellings, the inspector recorded. The appellant argued that because the proposal related to the change of use of the land for the siting of mobile homes and not operational development, that no affordable housing provision was necessary. The inspector, however, judged that the new park homes would for all intents and purposes be new homes. They would be self-contained units of accommodation and would be likely to provide living accommodation and facilities similar to a dwelling with space to cook, wash, sleep and relax. Accordingly, she held that the development plan policies relating to the provision of affordable housing were as relevant as they would be in cases of traditionally constructed dwellings.
The inspector did not doubt that park homes are likely to be cheaper to purchase or rent than traditional dwellings. She accepted that the provision of such homes on the site would therefore be likely to be attractive to certain members of the local community, as recognised in the Mobile (Park) Homes – Briefing Paper, House of Commons Library, to which the appellant had referred her. Nevertheless, there was no mechanism before her to ensure that the park homes would fall within any of the categories of affordable housing set out within the Framework and would remain so in the future. There was therefore no certainty that the development would provide an affordable route to those whose needs were not met by the market, whether that be affordable housing for rent, starter homes, discounted market sales housing, or other affordable routes to home ownership.
The inspector concluded that the park homes would not meet the planning definition of affordable housing, and the absence of affordable housing provision on the site would conflict with the aims of development plan policy which sought to provide homes to address the needs of different groups in the community.
Section 7.3 of DCP Online deals with the topic of affordable housing.
In deciding that the residential conversion of a barn in Cornwall under permitted development rights was ruled out by a condition attached to the planning permission for the building (DCS Number 400-020-154) an inspector has made reference to the nine principles for conditions set out in Dunnett.
The condition stated that “The development hereby permitted shall be used for agricultural storage or livestock purposes only and for no other purpose”. The reason for the condition was to enable the local planning authority to retain control over other uses that would not be appropriate in the isolated, rural location. Referring to case law set out in Dunnett Investments Ltd v SSCLG & East Dorset DC  & , the inspector considered that what was important was that there was something more in the condition than merely re-stating the terms of the permission in the description of development. He ruled that the words “for no other purpose” performed this task, moving the condition beyond simply defining the ambit of the permission.
The inspector recorded that nine principles for planning conditions were set out in Dunnett. “In summary, conditions should be construed in the context of the permission as a whole; in a common sense way; and not too narrowly or strictly. There is no reason to exclude an implied permission, but it must be remembered that a planning permission is a public document which may be relied upon by parties unrelated to those originally involved. A relatively cautious approach is required given the prospect for criminal proceedings; conditions must be construed objectively and not by what the parties may or may not have intended at the time; they must be clearly and expressly imposed; and construed in conjunction with the reasons for their imposition. Finally, the process of interpreting a condition does not differ materially from that appropriate to other legal documents.”
Applying these principles, particularly that the permission was a public document that might be relied upon by parties unrelated to those originally involved and that conditions should be construed in accordance with their reasons, led the inspector to conclude that the purpose of the condition was clearly one to restrict uses other than agricultural ones and went beyond simply defining the ambit of the permission. There was no need to read any words into or out of the condition and its reason in order to understand this, he held.
The inspector concluded that the condition had the effect of removing permitted development rights.
Section 4.4261 of DCP Online concerns the curtailment of the later exercise of planning rights.
An enforcement notice aimed at the residential use of land in Worcestershire has been declared a nullity by an inspector for the not uncommon reason of failing to specify a compliance period (DCS Number 400-020-206).
The inspector explained:
“The notice the subject of this appeal contains errors that renders it a nullity. Section 173 of the 1990 Act and Regulation 4 of the Town and Country Planning (Enforcement Notices and Appeals) (England) 2002 stipulate the matters to be specified in enforcement notices. One of these (Section 173(9) of the 1990 Act) is that the notice shall specify the period at the end of which any steps are required to have been taken or any activities are required to have ceased. The period for compliance must be separate from the 28 day period. A notice which contains no period whatever for compliance is a nullity, and the case of R (oao Lynes) v W Berkshire DC  EWHC 1828 found that a notice which specified “immediately” as the period for compliance fell into that category since that is not a “period” for the purposes of s173(9).”
The inspector recorded that in the case before him, rather than specifying a period for compliance with the requirements of the notice, compliance was required “as soon as the Enforcement Notice takes effect”, which, by reference to the case law could not be interpreted as an actual period of time. He further explained that failure to specify a period for compliance rendered the notice a nullity, and an enforcement notice that is a nullity is without legal effect and cannot be corrected or amended, or even quashed.
Accordingly, the appeal and the deemed application did not fall to be considered.
Remember this one.
Further explanation concerning period for compliance requirements can be found at section 4.5361 of DCP Online.
An appellant seeking to establish that the unfettered residential occupancy of a barn conversion in the Lake District would be lawful was disappointed when an inspector decided that the term ‘locality’ in a restrictive condition was precise and enforceable (DCS Number 400-020-182).
Planning permission for the conversion was subject to a condition that “The occupation of the dwelling shall be limited to a person solely or mainly employed or last employed in the locality, in agriculture as defined in Section 290(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, or in forestry, (including any dependants of such a person residing with him) or a widow or widower of such person.”
Firstly, the inspector noted that it was common ground that, because of the comma after the word ‘locality’, the condition allowed occupancy by a person solely or mainly employed or last employed in the locality, whether that employment was in agriculture or forestry or for other purposes altogether. Secondly, the inspector discussed the meaning of ‘locality’, noting the appellant’s argument that the use of the word was so imprecise as to make the condition unenforceable. To this end he reviewed relevant case law.
In Fawcett Properties Limited v Buckingham County Council (1960), the judge held that “a planning condition is only void for uncertainty if it can be given no meaning or no sensible or ascertainable meaning, and not merely because it is ambiguous or leads to absurd results.” The use of the word ‘locally’ in an occupancy condition was considered in the case of Alderson v SSE and Another (1984). In this case a judge said that “… the word “locally” has a perfectly intelligible meaning, although some doubtful cases might arise. If a doubtful case arises then it will be for the Court to say whether or not planning permission has been broken.” In the same case, another of the judges noted that the term “had been in wide use since the late 1960s at any rate, and so far as we are aware does not appear to have given rise to any difficulty.” The inspector held that the term ‘locally’ was not materially different in the present context from the words ‘in the locality’, which appeared in the condition in question and which appeared in Circular 24/73 and subsequent circulars up to Circular 11/95. In addition, the inspector recorded that in a large number of extracts from appeal decisions submitted by the council, it appeared that there had been little difficulty in interpreting ‘locality’ in the context of occupancy conditions and the facts of individual cases.
Similarly, the inspector saw no such difficulty in the present case. There was no requirement for the occupier to be employed on the appeal site, he ruled. He or she could be employed some distance away but not so far away as to invalidate one of the purposes of the condition, which was to preserve a stock of dwellings for the use of the local population. He regarded this as sufficiently precise and enforceable to comply with the relevant tests for conditions both at the time the condition was imposed and at the present time.
There is further information concerning local occupancy conditions at sections 10.3411 and 9.1411 of DCP Online.
In deciding an appeal against a south London council’s refusal to grant a certificate of lawfulness for a vehicle crossover (DCS Number 400-020-168), an inspector has distinguished between ‘porous’ and ‘permeable’ hard surfacing.
The council considered that the vehicular crossover would not fall within development permitted under Schedule 2, Part 2, Class B of the GPDO, the inspector recorded. She explained that this permits the construction of a new means of access to a highway, which is not a trunk road or a classified road, provided that access is required in connection with other permitted development. In the case before her the vehicular crossover was proposed in connection with the paved front garden, which would be used as a car parking space. The inspector further explained that the creation of a hard surface incidental to the enjoyment of a dwellinghouse is permitted development under Schedule 2, Part 1, Class F of the GPDO, subject to certain conditions and limitations. Development is permitted providing condition F.2 is satisfied which requires that where the hard surface is at the front of the property, and the area covered by the hard surface would exceed five square metres, either the hard surface is made of porous materials or provision is made for water run-off within the curtilage of the dwellinghouse. She identified the dispute between the parties as concerning whether or not the existing hard surface in the front garden was porous.
The inspector reasoned that the block paving of the front garden would be porous if the blocks themselves allowed water to pass through. On the other hand, it would be permeable if there were open voids across the surface of the block paving to allow water through to the underlying substrate. She noted that there was no information before her regarding the nature of the blocks and whether or not they were constructed from porous materials. In terms of permeability, the paving had been partly pointed, which she considered was likely to have the effect of infilling the voids and restricting permeability.
The inspector concluded that it had not been shown that the hard surface would be permitted development as condition F.2 had not been satisfied. As a result, it had not been shown that the vehicular crossover would be required in connection with other permitted development, the car parking space provided by the hardstanding. A certificate of lawfulness was denied.
Further practice examples relating to Part 2, Class B of the GPDO can be found at section 4.3422 of DCP Online, and Part 1, Class F at section 4.3421.
In a previous blog, Flame test, we reported an appeal case in which an inspector was not satisfied that a sprinkler system would provide adequate mitigation against fire safety risk at a site for four flats which would be inaccessible to fire appliances. In another appeal concerning the erection of one dwelling in Greater Manchester, on the other hand, an inspector decided that sprinklers would overcome the problem.
In this case, (DCS Number 400-020-145), the inspector noted that at its narrowest point, the short access was 2.39 metres in width, below the minimum width of 2.75 metres that was required for a fire engine to access the site. He noted, however, that Manual for Streets (2007) advises that “residential sprinkler systems are highly regarded by the FRS and their presence allows a longer response time to be used. A site layout which has been rejected on the grounds of accessibility for fire appliances may become acceptable if its buildings are equipped with these systems”. Given that the proposal was for a single dwelling only, he considered that this measure would provide appropriate mitigation to any fire risk.
The principal differences between the two cases are the number of residential units and the length of the access. But, if a fire engine can’t get to the fire the difference in the length of the access is immaterial, isn’t it?
Section 4.1542 of DCP Online concerns fire prevention.
At the spookiest time of the year we found this in an appeal against the refusal of planning permission for the residential conversion of a church in the Scottish Highlands (DCS Number 400-019-958):
“I am satisfied that during the construction phase, there will be minimal disruption or disturbance to those buried in the graveyard….”
Section 10.3 of DCP Online covers institutional building conversion.
The conventional planning view has been that low levels of car ownership can be expected amongst elderly people, and accordingly, parking requirements at retirement housing need only be minimal. Perhaps this view is becoming a little outdated, as an inspector determining an appeal against the refusal of planning permission for sheltered retirement apartments in Essex points out (DCS Number 400-019-603):
“I do not subscribe to the notion that retired occupants would by their very nature be less likely to own a vehicle. I would in fact suggest it is quite to the contrary, appreciating that self-reliance and freedom/distance of movement would be a value held high by those at a stage in their life where they have more free time.”
Of course, whether having a nonagenarian behind the wheel of a car is a good idea is another thing.
Section 7.237 of DCP Online addresses the topic of parking at retirement housing.
We all have to keep up with the times, including inspectors.
An inspector determining an appeal relating to a 49-storey mixed use building in east London (DCS Number 200-007-957) has reported that “At the site visit, virtual reality goggles allowed me to ‘see’ the proposed building in its future surroundings.”
Looks like he appreciated the experience – he granted permission.
Section 5.34 of DCP Online concerns appeal procedures.