Further confirmation that ‘isolated’ in Paragraph 55 of the NPPF means physically isolated comes in the shape of a recent appeal relating to the refusal of outline permission for redevelopment of commercial buildings and a bungalow in the Worcestershire countryside with five dwellings (DCS Number 400-017-468). In this case the inspector usefully quotes the words of the judge in Braintree District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Greyread Limited & Granville Developments Limited :
Posts By: dcplatest
Regular readers will be aware that in a couple of posts we have drawn attention to the lack of a definition for ‘isolated’ in the NPPF; Nature abhors a vacuum and ‘Isolation’ – Now we’re getting somewhere. Readers might also be aware that the matter has been addressed recently in the High Court – Braintree District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government . Here on the Blog we have been keeping watch for an appeal case which refers to this court ruling in order to understand its impact in practice, and a useful example has come up in Worcestershire (DCS Number 400-017-452). This case involves the conversion of storage buildings adjacent to a village settlement boundary to three dwellings. Despite being identified as being within open countryside, the site was not isolated, the inspector concluded:
An inspector dealing with an appeal against a Dorset council’s refusal to remove an agricultural occupancy condition from a six bedroom house with a tennis court, swimming pool and extensive grounds (DCS Number 200-007-059) reminds us that planning really ought to involve some degree of looking ahead.
We have referred previously to the absence of a definition of ‘isolated’ in the NPPF – ‘Isolation’ – Now we’re getting somewhere – and the efforts of inspectors to fill the void. Here is a bit more from an inspector dealing with an appeal against the refusal of outline planning permission for two dwellings in rural Suffolk (DCS Number 400-017-227).
An inspector has upheld an enforcement notice requiring the demolition of a new building on a farm holding on green belt land in Derbyshire, after finding that it had been designed as a residential property (DCS Number 400-017-202).
How do you tell the difference between a development scheme which has been artificially divided in order to avoid a requirement for affordable housing provision and one which hasn’t? You apply the tripartite test, that’s how.
A procedural note taken from an appeal against an enforcement notice (400-017-156):
“The allegation refers to the material change of use of the land to use as domestic curtilage. The Council is aware that curtilage is not a use of land and has suggested that I use my power under s176 to correct the notice to refer to the use of land for purposes incidental to the use as a dwelling or use of land for domestic purposes.”
Dismissing an appeal for the retention of seven studio flats in a building which had been granted planning permission for four one-bedroom flats (DCS Number 200-006-996), an inspector was not persuaded by the appellant’s argument that there are no internal space standard requirements in Part O of the GPDO.
Show this one to your stubborn client who refuses to heed your expert advice not to appeal.
An inspector dealing with the proposed residential conversion of a derelict building in north Yorkshire has awarded costs against the appellants, finding that they had acted unreasonably in appealing (DCS Number 400-016-970).
The nature of ‘conditions precedent’ has been exercising the finest minds in planning, as indicated in The order of precedence. When considering whether a permission has been lawfully implemented despite being in breach of a condition precedent a principal consideration is whether or not the details required go to the heart of the matter.